THE regional geopolitical landscape remains highly tense, with Afghanistan, India and Pakistan positioned on a delicate escalation ladder. What is contributing significantly to this tension is the role of non-state actors. Where Afghanistan and Pakistan are concerned, the TTP is now a major point of contention. Meanwhile, for India and Pakistan, the situation has been exacerbated by the recent terrorist attack in Delhi. The identities and motives of the perpetrators are not clear, neither are possible links with regional or international terrorist networks. Nevertheless, it is evident that terrorist actors are a key factor in conflict escalation in the region. The irony is that political leaders are viewing the problem primarily through geopolitical and ideological lenses, an approach that will only benefit the terrorists.
States and their security institutions, particularly in South Asia, have long been accustomed to interpreting terrorism-related threats within broad geopolitical frameworks. While this may provide some diplomatic or political leverage, it rarely contributes to actually resolving the underlying issues. This is precisely what terrorist actors want. They exploit such environments, expanding their operational space with minimal investment in attacks that can inflict disproportionate damage on both inter-state relations and lives.
One of the core domains in which terrorism operates lies between the broader geopolitical environment and the counterterrorism practices of states. Terrorist organisations shape their strategies, operations, narratives, and political messaging within this space. When state priorities shift, terrorists exploit the resulting vacuums and disruptions. A case in point is the US shift in focus from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2003, which expanded the theatre of war for terrorist groups. This allowed them to build extensive networks. Their internal differences, rooted in divergent readings of global and regional politics, initially weakened them, but these same differences eventually gave birth to the militant Islamic State (IS) group and several other groups across Iraq and Syria.
Terrorist groups also drew ideological strength from the nature of the US, Nato, and allied counterterrorism approaches, which were often brutal and violated humanitarian norms. From abuses at Abu Ghraib to torture cells, and later the collateral damage caused by drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Africa, and the Gulf, these actions fuelled resentment. Terrorist groups effectively exploited this anger to amplify their narratives, enhance their recruitment, and sustain their financial networks.
When state priorities shift, terrorists exploit the resulting vacuums and disruptions.
It is not surprising that when then president Barack Obama announced America’s exit from Iraq in October 2011, most terrorist groups redirected their focus towards the Assad regime in Syria. Although Russia, Israel, Iran, Turkey and the Arab states pursued their own geopolitical agendas, they eventually recalibrated their political positions within the increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. Over time, they adopted more pragmatic approaches. As the conflict evolved, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-led alliance captured key areas around Damascus and gradually emerged as a significant actor in both regional and global politics. Recently, President Donald Trump received Ahmed al-Sharaa, who headed HTS, and praised him in his typical style, declaring that under his leadership, Syria would become a vibrant state.
The Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, gained considerable strength from the expanding conflict and from the support they received within the neighbourhood, particularly from Pakistan, which enhanced both their operational capacity and political leverage. Afghanistan, however, represented a very different theatre of war. Its geopolitics were not as multi-layered or complex as those in Iraq and Syria. The principal clash of interests centred on Pakistan and India, and this rivalry shaped much of the Nato presence in Afghanistan.
Iran, for its part, was occupied with multiple regional priorities. Its main focus was the Middle East, where it sought to secure its proxies and allies in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Consequently, Iran invested more in recruiting fighters from these regions, while providing support to certain Taliban factions at a level that never matched Pakistan’s influence.
For the Taliban, the equations were not particularly difficult. They found political and strategic space between US and Nato urgency to exit the region and Pakistan’s desire to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan. What later unfolded between Pakistan and the Taliban is a separate story, one that has become increasingly evident in recent developments. Afghanistan’s conservative, tribal-centric nationalist tendencies also enabled the Taliban to shape their political approach, negotiate with the US and later manoeuvre strategically in their dealings with Pakistan.
However, the major commonality between HTS and the Taliban was that both were claimants to territory and to a form of power that their respective religious or ethnic groups believed they had lost. Al Qaeda, by contrast, belonged to a different category, anchored in ideological operations rather than territorial ambition. It sharpened the political worldview of terrorist organisations across the globe, and to some extent, IS later followed its template. Al Qaeda remained an inspiration and a connective force for smaller terrorist groups, self-radicalised individuals and segments of Muslim diaspora communities, as well as Muslim societies.
Al Qaeda also shaped the worldview of Pakistani and Kashmir-based groups. Its call for ‘global jihad’ encouraged militants to detach themselves from state agendas and pursue a ‘pure’ cause, fighting for lands free from the influence of Muslim states, which they perceived as subservient to a global imperial order. An example is Zakir Musa in Indian-held Kashmir, who attempted to ‘purify’ the Kashmiri jihad movement. He openly criticised groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and claimed that jihad should be waged solely for God.
In many instances, terrorist groups deliberately create conditions that push states to the brink of confrontation, as Al Qaeda (through LeT) attempted with the Mumbai attacks in 2008. They closely study political contexts and exploit any emerging fissures within states. In India’s context, the probability cannot be ruled out that a rogue or self-radicalised cell of indoctrinated individuals can independently conceive and execute acts of violence driven by utopian or grandiose ideas rooted in faith, ethnicity, freedom, perceived suppression, or reactions to repression.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, November 16th, 2025
