THERE is a war in the neighbourhood and no one can be sure how long it might last. And for Pakistan this conflict brings a set of challenges which are not going to be easy to manage. Indeed, for months and years, those commenting on the country have been speaking of the multiple crises here — polycrisis for those with better vocabulary. And now, these are going to intensify with the spillover of the conflict in Iran.
At one level, this has not caught anyone unawares, especially those in power. For a considerable period, genuine concern had been expressed about the impact of a conflict in Iran; it was pointed out multiple times that an insecure or unstable Iran would cause problems in Pakistan because of a common border — for a number of reasons.
Take the recent hike in petrol prices. Not only is this the most obvious effect of a spillover but also one which will dominate the public discourse, especially on the heavily censored mainstream media. Regardless of how justified it may be from the point of view of a government trying to balance the demands of an IMF-mandated revenue target and to prevent hoarding, the hike has and will hit the people very hard.
Already struggling with their much-weakened purchasing power, the arrival of inflation will add to their woes and this will prove costly for the government. While those in power have no choice but to bear the ire of the people, the situation will lead to more questions about the longevity of this set-up; dire predictions about riots and protests have already begun.
The government can claim to be confident about their staying power, but its lack of popular support and inflation will feed into each other. And this will lend greater credence to that absence of stability.
The worsening economic situation will feed into the mood against the government.
It is also noteworthy that the price of oil may rise further and there is a likelihood of shortages too, if the hostilities don’t cease. In other words, this cycle is expected to last and intensify.
On the economic front, the government doesn’t only have to contend with inflation and its impact on the people but also the larger economic issues. If oil prices continue to rise, experts point out, revenue collection can face setbacks and the current account can weaken.
This will put the government in a fragile position vis-à-vis the IMF programme. With time, as the Gulf states deal with the attacks, and if their economies falter, remittances are expected to be impacted also. And with the closure of routes, there is already talk of Pakistan’s exports also slowing down.
But while the economic ramifications will be discussed to death, less will be said officially about the political impact. As it is, the worsening economic situation and the people’s anger will feed into the mood against the government.
More serious is the sectarian situation. The protests which erupted after the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei should have been given far more attention than they were. With restrictions on coverage, it is hard to tell how spontaneous these protests were. But they did turn violent in more than one location. And questions are being asked if the events in Karachi and Gilgit-Baltistan can occur again.
In the latter, already seen as a sensitive area, a curfew has been imposed and police have announced that those accused of attacking military installations will be tried in military courts. It was also said that police were investigating the possibility of the protests being organised and planned, hinting at players with resources.
Though it is hard to predict the future, one would be complacent in assuming that the situation is under control. The sectarian issue has never been an easy one to handle for Pakistan and what is happening in Iran is emotive for both the Shia and Sunni communities. The longer the war goes on, the more emotive it will become. And this can fan anger against the government and others.
As it is, there is considerable criticism at the moment of decisions such as the one to join the Board of Peace; and there is rumour-mongering about the country’s role in the aggression against Iran. The gap between the people and state is already wide and it is hard to see how it will be bridged as the state tries to maintain its foreign policy commitments.
Last but not least is the security situation. Recent weeks have shown that militancy in both KP and Balochistan is still hard to control. In fact, there is a constant trickle of news about attacks, which appear to slow down each time Islamabad asserts itself against Kabul, be it by closing the border or carrying out strikes there. And then, the attacks begin again. Despite what government officials may say, it is clear that neither terrorism nor retaliation is going to end soon. Add to this mix an unstable Iran, and the problem may just worsen.
An unstable Iran could mean another volatile border with a refugee problem, or more militancy. After all, if the government in Tehran weakens further, terrorists gain the upper hand in areas near the Iran-Pakistan border. As it is, Kulbhushan Jadhav, the Indian spy, was said to have been arrested from near the border with Iran and Mullah Mansoor had also crossed over from Iran into Pakistan shortly before he was killed in a drone strike.
In addition, there are fears that a regime change in Iran could mean yet another unfriendly neighbour for Pakistan. Indeed, the instability in Iran and the region can bring many headaches for Pakistan and anyone of them could become a full-blown migraine. The government and the people would do well to brace for some pain.
The writer is a journalist.
Published in Dawn, March 10th, 2026
