THE trajectory of Pakistan-US relations has once again been defined by strategic pragmatism rather than a durable partnership. Recent statements from Washington reaffirm that bilateral engagement continues to revolve around two principal pillars: access to critical mineral resources and counterterrorism cooperation.
While the evolving US strategic posture in South Asia is largely shaped by its competition with China and alignment with India, Pakistan remains embedded within this framework due to its geostrategic relevance, serving as a check on India.
Addressing the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on South and Central Asia recently, Assistant Secretary of State Paul Kapur underscored these priorities. He noted that Washington is working with Pakistan to harness the potential of its critical mineral reserves, combining US government seed financing with private sector expertise to generate mutual economic benefits. At the same time, he emphasised that continued counterterrorism cooperation serves a dual purpose, strengthening Pakistan’s capacity to manage internal security challenges while addressing transnational threats that could affect the US and its partners.
Perhaps the Middle East does not fall within Kapur’s portfolio, and that is why he did not comment on Pakistan’s relevance in this context, especially in light of the growing crisis with Iran and the Gaza peace plan, ie, the Board of Peace, whose meeting is scheduled this month, and which Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is expected to attend. At the meeting, he would announce Pakistan’s commitment to the Gaza peace plan, particularly its contribution to a Gaza stabilisation force.
Pakistan is currently relevant across multiple domains of US geo-economic and strategic objectives, particularly in three regions: South, Central, and West Asia. In these different regions, Pakistan serves different US interests. If we set aside the Middle East for a while in Pakistan-US relations, America’s priority list would include counterterrorism cooperation, containing China, and economic cooperation in the mineral sector in South and Central Asia. Even Kapur hinted at the same in his briefing. However, in South Asia, three additional elements emerge.
First, encouraging India to develop independently, stand on its own, and preserve its freedom of action serves broader US strategic objectives, particularly preventing China or any single hegemonic power from dominating the region. At the same time, supporting Pakistan helps maintain a balance that checks Indian intentions.
Perhaps we need a new approach towards Afghanistan, one that is not aligned with any camp.
Second, through financial assistance via international monetary institutions and by enhancing economic cooperation in critical sectors, the US seeks to engage Pakistan. This approach encourages segments of Pakistan’s power elite to limit their inclination towards deeper strategic alignment with China, which could otherwise affect US influence and reduce India’s political appeal in the region.
Third, Pakistan serves as a primary partner for counterterrorism in Central Asia, but also in the broader SCO and regional context, where Pakistan can be viewed as a partner maintaining deep relations with the US. While this may continue to irritate Russia, Pakistan’s growing relations with Central Asian states also carry geo-economic advantages. However, Afghanistan remains a constraint in this design, and Balochistan, where mineral and counterterrorism interests converge, poses another critical challenge.
Interestingly, while the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs was briefing Congress, the deputy assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, John Mark Pomeroy, was visiting Islamabad to explore and enhance partnership in the mineral sector. During a meeting with the interior minister, while condoling the tragic terror incidents in Islamabad and Balochistan, he emphasised that Pakistan believes in global partnerships to eliminate terrorism and promote investment, echoing the same position articulated by the assistant secretary himself during the congressional hearing.
The question is whether the US would partner with Pakistan to soften Afghanistan, the main hurdle in connectivity between Pakistan and Central Asia, and enhance cooperation to build Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities to reduce risks in Balochistan, which is essential for the utilisation of the province’s mineral resources.
Interestingly, Afghanistan and Balochistan both connect to the US and China’s strategic designs, particularly in counterterrorism efforts and competition in the race for rare earth minerals. China remains reluctant to intervene or deepen security cooperation beyond a certain point, as Beijing sees long-term political, strategic and economic consequences. In contrast, the US is a notoriously ambitious actor willing to take risks. If it is willing to take risks to denuclearise Iran to serve Israel and its Arab allies, would it be prepared to do something similarly provocative in Afghanistan, perhaps to create pressure or controversy over Bagram, as Trump had earlier instigated and tested reactions?
The US does not seem interested in intervening directly in Afghanistan, as it would be too early for another military involvement. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution recently extending by one year the mandate of the Monitoring Team that supports the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee, which oversees sanctions imposed on the Afghan Taliban, indicating continued US attention and an indication that Washington still wants to give some more time to the Taliban regime.
However, one possibility cannot be ruled out that the US may increase its diplomatic as well as equipment support to Pakistan, targeting terrorist hideouts in Afghanistan, which will keep pressure on the Taliban regime. But, this level of intervention will likely remain minimal and may not help Pakistan influence the Taliban to cooperate on counterterrorism issues, and may not even be able to force the Taliban to change their attitude towards their own people.
Perhaps Pakistan needs a new approach towards Afghanistan, one that is independent and not aligned with any camp, whether the US or China. Such an approach may help gauge the real potential for cooperation, as well as the adversity and costs involved. Pakistan also needs a different approach to dealing with Balochistan, a vision that begins a journey towards peace through peaceful means, which would enhance stability and long-term regional cooperation. But is this a wish list that the power elites would not like to read?
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, February 15th, 2026
