AS May approaches, memories of the conflict between India and Pakistan are once again coming to the fore.
What was not anticipated, however, was that this year would present multifold challenges for Pakistan, ranging from tensions on another front with Afghanistan to the pressures of the Iran-US war, testing the country’s strategic and diplomatic capacities. At the same time, as the anniversary of the May stand-off nears, a renewed war of words between the two neighbours is inevitable.
Almost a year has passed since the two months of heightened tension and the brief four-day war, triggered by a terrorist incident in Pahalgam in India-held Kashmir on April 22. That crisis disrupted the prevailing geopolitical balance: India’s regional influence appeared to wane, while Pakistan found diplomatic space and regained a measure of confidence on the international stage.
Despite the charged rhetoric, the likelihood of a fresh military confrontation remains low.
Recent provocative statements, particularly by Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, who suggested that last year’s operation has not yet concluded, and the response from Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, emphasising that any notion of war between two nuclear states is inconceivable and fraught with severe consequences, reflect more of a rhetorical escalation than an imminent conflict. Nevertheless, the memory of last year’s crisis is likely to rekindle public sentiment and political posturing on both sides.
India remains central to Pakistan’s strategic thinking, whatever it may be doing in the geopolitical and strategic spheres. Pakistan’s ongoing, war-like confrontation with Afghanistan is not only aimed at eliminating the terrorist threat but also at building pressure to ensure that India cannot use this backyard against Pakistan.
India remains central to Pakistan’s strategic thinking.
Whatever diplomatic capital the country may gain through facilitating diplomatic channels between Iran and the US, or by standing with Saudi Arabia if it becomes involved in a potential US-Israel conflict with Iran, serves a broader purpose.
First, Pakistan’s goodwill in Tehran could widen the existing gulf between Iran and India, especially at a time when India appears to be in diplomatic retreat. Second, enhancing cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states could help Pakistan regain the trust that had been eroding as India expanded its strategic and economic partnerships with Arab states.
While whenever the interests of Pakistan and America have converged, Pakistan’s goodwill in Washington has often been short-lived, it has nonetheless enabled Pakistan to gain sufficient strength to balance India in the defence and geopolitical domains.
Here, the question arises: even if Afghanistan reaches an agreement with Pakistan and agrees to develop a verifiable mechanism to address terrorist threats originating from its territory, will it bring an end to their conflict?
While both countries remained engaged in working-level talks in the Chinese city of Urumqi, analysts seemed pessimistic about any conclusive outcome. The roots of mistrust between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban run much deeper than what is visible on the surface.
It is noteworthy that Pakistan is simultaneously engaged in backdoor diplomacy and reconciliation efforts in a much larger global conflict, while China is assisting it in managing tensions with its neighbour. This reflects the differing priorities, ambitions and compulsions of both states.
On one hand, China, a major global power, appears cautious about getting directly involved in the West Asian war theatre. On the other hand, Pakistan seems to be playing a role aligned with US interests, while its confrontation with Afghanistan risks undermining Chinese interests, prompting Beijing to offer mediation.
For China, relatively little is at stake in the Middle East. It maintains working relations with all regional states and even in the event of a regime change in Iran its core interests would unlikely be significantly affected. China would likely adapt and build relations with any new leadership, much as it has with the current Iranian establishment.
Chinese geopolitical pragmatism drives its policies, whereas Pakistan’s policy drivers are more deep-rooted in its strategic competition with India. This fundamental difference places the two countries in very different strategic domains. It also helps explain the dynamics at play when Pakistani officials, including Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, engaged with Foreign Minister Wang Yi in China.
Although Pakistan and China agreed on a five-point initiative hailed by Pakistan as a milestone, Beijing made no firm commitment to assuming a leading role in resolving the Middle East conflict. Pakistan had hoped that China might act as a guarantor of any potential peace deal between Iran and the US.
Along with its regional partners, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Egypt, Pakistan had anticipated that China would step forward as both mediator and guarantor in the event of an Iran-US agreement. However, Beijing appears to view the proposal differently, possibly with some suspicion that such a role could draw it into a conflict shaped by Washington’s strategic calculations.
US President Donald Trump’s recent address has further complicated Pakistan’s challenges, as he announced another round of strikes on Iran. This has, for the time being, diminished prospects of a diplomatic solution while raising the risk that the conflict could expand.
In such a scenario, the Gulf states may become directly involved in an effort to bring the conflict to a swift end, given the stakes for their economies and political stability, particularly concerns over the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the possibility of Iranian strikes on their territory. This, in turn, could lead to the need to activate the defence pact between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
This remains a hypothetical scenario, but it cannot be entirely ruled out. If it were to materialise, it would test Pakistan’s commitments to Saudi Arabia, as well as its diplomatic and defence capabilities, while also challenging its ability to secure its southwestern borders.
Few had imagined last year that these past few months would bring challenges greater than the stand-off with India. Yet, such moments of strain can lead to either significant setbacks or strategic breakthroughs that reshape regional equations.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, April 5th, 2026
