THE Arab Gulf states are in a bind. They argue that they are neutral and don’t support the US-Israel war on Iran. Tehran, on the other hand, sees the presence of American bases on their territories as compromising their status as neutral powers.
One way to look at it is to innovate — for the purpose of this crisis — a distinction between the political neutrality of the Gulf states and their legal neutrality. Legal neutrality, or the absence thereof, is to be ascertained from the texts of defence pacts and the quasi status of agreements that the Gulf states have executed with the US for the last 40-plus years. Most can be accessed on the website of the UN and US treaty series. My team accessed a few agreements and their analysis shows that they were intended for training, upkeep, immunity, parking aircraft, docking ships, etc, during peacetime — and not meant to extend support to the US during an armed conflict. To the governments or sovereigns of the Gulf states, these agreements provided the comfort of knowing that a superpower was present in their backyard, although the agreements retrieved do not seem to provide any guarantee of protection during aggression.
However, even if the agreements are read as providing legal evidence of compromised neutrality, the present position of the Gulf states has been the opposite — they have vehemently opposed attacks on Iran, a demonstration of ‘political neutrality’. In other words, none of the Gulf states wanted the war against Iran. None showed any belligerent intention towards it. Political differences with Iran on regional issues such as support to non-state actors apart, the Gulf states have never raised armed forces and made preparations to attack Iran. This is a sound basis for their claim of being neutral. True, since several of them had given bases to the US military and many of these bases were used for attacks on Iran, this neutrality stood compromised — but only in a very limited sense, ie, in a legal sense.
Iran must understand that the political neutrality claimed by the Gulf states is an important aspect. Strategic wisdom warrants that the civilian infrastructure of such Gulf states should not be included in the IRGC’s targets. Some states have asked the US not to use their territory to launch attacks on Iran. Some may have constraints and are thus unable to promptly cancel these long-standing detailed agreements regarding military bases and the status of the forces agreements. It is very much possible that Gulf states hosting such facilities have no detailed or advance knowledge of the bases being used to conduct military operations against Iran. That is why such attacks should not be attributable, under the principles of state responsibility, to the host Gulf state. In the absence of the said state being directly responsible for an attack on Iran, its civilian infrastructure should not be a target. Most of these states, through official spokespersons, sovereigns or senior office-holders, have sufficiently demonstrated and communicated their political neutrality in this conflict. This declared political neutrality is also evident from the fact that Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, have not directly responded to Iranian attacks. Only the UAE has — and that too recently — as it showed its leaning towards arguments for a face-off with Iran.
Iran’s leadership also needs to understand that civilian airports, residential districts, commercial towers, desalination plants and energy facilities do not become lawful targets simply because a state wishes to retaliate or signal resolve. Launching missiles or drones into densely populated Gulf cities cannot be squared with either rule. Even if Iran frames its actions as self-defence or reprisals, international humanitarian law doesn’t permit actions against civilians under any circumstances, making such strikes unlawful.
International humanitarian law prohibits attacks against civilians under any circumstances.
Given that the office of the ayatollah also leans on Islamic law while taking strategic or military decisions (for example, the fatwa against nuclear weapons) one must note that across Sunni and Shia jurisprudence, the rules of warfare emphasise the protection of non-combatants and the avoidance of wanton destruction. Indiscriminate or retaliatory attacks on civilian areas in Gulf states violate these principles and undermine the moral legitimacy that Iran often claims in its regional posture.
No wonder the recent UNSC Resolution 2817 is critical of such targeting by Iran of Gulf states — rightly so because it relies on a common civilisational framework of do’s and don’ts during conflict that assert that notwithstanding the lawful justification of war, combat shall follow certain rules of engagement — the foremost being that civilians and infrastructure used by and for civilians are treated as protected from attacks. Although the resolution has been criticised by Russia for not declaring that the aggression by the US and Israel violates international law, the fact is that such a finding could not be realistically stated with one of the P5 countries itself one of the two aggressors.
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has led to around 3,000 merchant vessels and cargo ships being held up, which is affecting the economy of many states that politically meet the definition of neutral states under the1907 Conventions. Apart from the cargo costs and insurance issues, food and water supplies are drying up for around 20,000 stranded seafarers. Global markets are panicking. Blockades of straits and other waterways are not unheard of but last typically for the duration of an armed conflict, and not in peacetime. Iran’s argument that since it is facing armed aggression and the threat of boots on the ground it has the right to enforce the blockade to deter the US and Israel, is in line with past blockades during conflict. That is why Pakistan is trying hard for a ceasefire so that the armed conflict ceases — even temporarily — and thus enables the mediator (Pakistan) to rightly insist to Iran that it lift the blockade. It is recognised that during peacetime, transit through straits has to be granted. This is provided for in Part III of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention — which Iran very smartly and perhaps in anticipation of the present conflict chose not to ratify.
Taken together, these elements point towards a clear conclusion. Iran’s attacks on civilian targets in Gulf states erode its diplomatic standing in the Gulf, and risk widening the conflict by drawing previously restrained states into active participation. The most prudent course is for Iran to accord respect to the political neutrality claimed by the Gulf states.
The writer is a former caretaker federal law minister and a public international law practitioner.
Published in Dawn, April 4th, 2026
