PAKISTAN has long remained on the US threat radar. However, evolving dynamics in West Asia, particularly Iran’s assertive posture, have placed the country under renewed scrutiny. America’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment [ATA] presented to the Senate Intelligence Committee last week, names Pakistan alongside China, Russia, North Korea and Iran among the states developing a range of advanced and traditional missile delivery systems, capable of carrying nuclear or conventional payloads that could potentially strike the US homeland.
The ATA categorises nations based on certain criteria, including their strategic orientation. There’s a complex profile in Pakistan’s case, which is seen to tilt towards China, signal ambiguously on Iran, support Saudi Arabia, and be increasingly inclined towards Russia in the strategic and geo-economic domains. This kind of a posture is often seen as uncertain and is hence suspicious in Washington’s strategic calculus. Even countries with long-standing security partnerships with the US are under scrutiny.
At the same time, the ATA acknowledges Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts, which were also recognised by President Donald Trump in his first address to Congress last year and by Centcom chief Gen Michael Kurilla. But CT cooperation can’t ensure broader strategic alignment; it simply opens space for dialogue and cooperation in other areas, as was reflected in Pakistan’s securing IMF support and reaching a fairly acceptable tariff arrangement with the US.
Two internal dimensions also shape such assessments. First, the ideological and political orientation of the public, and, where divergence exists, the power elite’s ability to manage public sentiment at times of crises. Second, persisting internal conflicts can trigger instability and influence elite decision-making, particularly in ways that affect the regional and global geopolitical landscape.
The US views Pakistan’s efforts to modernise its missile programme with caution.
The ATA also reflects views long held by analysts who shape public discourse and are taken seriously by policymakers in Islamabad. Since the Iran-Israel-US crisis escalated last June, some analysts have warned that Iran’s collapse could bring Israel closer to Pakistan’s strategic horizon. Israel and Pakistan see threats in each other as a result of ideological, strategic and regional factors. Israel’s close links with India and Pakistan’s strong military capabilities and ties with the Gulf states have contributed to such a view. In particular, Pakistan’s nuclear capability is often framed in Israeli discourse in connection with Saudi Arabia’s security concerns.
Pakistan, however, has consistently maintained that its nuclear programme is for deterrence and to preserve the strategic balance in South Asia, primarily with regard to India. When Pakistan engaged with the Trump-led Board of Peace, it did so partly to reduce suspicions and demonstrate a responsible role on the Palestinian issue together with its partners in western Asia and the larger Muslim world — it was a political move to secure its relevance to America’s security paradigm. And yet, US threat perceptions have their own logic. The US views Pakistan’s efforts to modernise and upgrade its missile programme with caution, particularly with regard to systems that it feels could threaten the US homeland. Given the deep intelligence and strategic links between the US, Israel and India, it is difficult to ignore the fact that both countries may reinforce Washington’s concerns about Pakistan’s defence capabilities.
US-Pakistan relations have always been complex. They’ve been marked by cycles of cooperation and divergence driven by differing strategic priorities. Pakistan’s geographic position, its large Muslim population, and its strategic relevance have provided it with leverage, but these factors have also exposed it to regional rivalries, especially with India. While the US offers economic engagement, limited defence cooperation and diplomatic leverage, its political influence remains particularly important for Pakistan, especially in times of crisis with India. This was seen last year when Washington helped facilitate a ceasefire after the four-day Pak-India hostilities.
Pakistan, too, maintains its own threat assessments regarding the US, which it doesn’t see as a fully reliable partner. Instead, the relationship has evolved into a pragmatic, functional engagement, which is grounded in realpolitik. In contrast, Pakistan’s ties with China are framed as a more stable partnership based on mutual trust. Both the US and China, however, share concerns about Pakistan’s internal security challenges and its approach to Afghanistan, where Pakistan largely operates without a reliable partner.
This convergence is reflected in the ATA, which notes that Islamabad has grown increasingly frustrated with the presence of anti-Pakistan terrorist groups operating from Afghanistan amid rising terrorism at home. While the Taliban publicly call for dialogue, they continue to harbour such groups.
The US releases its threat assessment annually, offering insight into how it views both allies and adversaries. Yet, like most major powers, it does not formally reflect on how others perceive it, particularly when its policies place even its partners under strain. This much was evident recently when the American military presence in allied Arab states, despite being framed as a security guarantee, exposed these countries to Iranian retaliation. At the same time, Washington’s clear preference for Israel and its framing of the Iran threat have, at times, contributed to wider economic and geopolitical tensions. Similarly, recent frictions with European and North American partners, such as tensions involving Canada and debates around Greenland, are reminders that even close allies are not immune to pressure.
This reflects a broader dilemma of great powers: in attempting to correct one mistake, they make another. Over time, the unchecked privilege of such decisions can erode credibility. The greatest cost is not strategic miscalculation alone, but also the gradual loss of trust among allies.
For Pakistan, the most viable course is a balanced one. It is likely to continue engaging with the US, particularly in West Asia, while carefully safeguarding its own strategic interests and avoiding direct friction with its partners. In times of uncertainty, such calibrated positioning offers resilience, though the evolving dynamics will inevitably demand new responses and adjustments.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, March 23rd, 2026
